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Abstract
During the Covid-19 pandemics, we also experience another dangerous pandemics
based on misinformation. Narratives disconnected from fact-checking on the
origin and cure of the disease intertwined with pre-existing political fights. We
collect a database on Twitter posts and analyse the topology of the networks of
retweeters (users broadcasting again the same elementary piece of information, or
tweet) and validate its structure with methods of statistical physics of networks.
Furthermore, by using commonly available fact checking software, we assess the
reputation of the pieces of news exchanged. By using a combination of theoretical
and practical weapons, we are able to track down the flow of misinformation in a
snapshot of the Twitter ecosystem. Thanks to the presence of verified users, we
can also assign a polarization to the network nodes (users) and see the impact of
low-quality information producers and spreaders in the Twitter ecosystem.
Keywords: COVID-19 Infodemics; Misinformation; Disinformation; Twitter
1 Introduction
Propaganda and disinformation have a history as long as mankind, and the
phenomenon becomes particularly strong in difficult times, such as wars and
natural disasters. The advent of the internet and social media has amplified and
made faster the spread of biased and false news, and made targeting specific
segments of the population possible [7]. For this reason the Vice-President of the
European Commission with responsibility for policies on values and transparency,
Ve˘ra Yourova´, announced, beginning of June 2020, a European Democracy Action
Plan, expected by the end of 2020, in which web platforms admins will be called
for greater accountability and transparency, since ‘everything cannot be allowed
online’ [16].
Manufacturers and spreaders of online disinformation have been particularly
active also during the Covid-19 pandemic period (e.g., writing about Bill Gates
role in the pandemics or about masks killing children [2, 3]). This, alongside the
real pandemics[17], has led to the emergence of a new virtual disease: Covid-19
Infodemics.
In this paper, we shall consider the situation in Italy, one of the most affected
countries in Europe, where the virus struck in a devastating way between the end
of February and the end of April[1]. In such a sad and uncertain time, propaganda
[1]In Italy, since the beginning of the pandemics and at time of writing, almost 310k
persons have contracted the Covid-19 virus: of these, more than 35k have died.
Source: http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/. Accessed September 28, 2020.
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has worked hard: One of the most followed fake news was published by Sputnik
Italia receiving 112,800 likes, shares and comments on the most popular social
media. ‘The article falsely claimed that Poland had not allowed a Russian plane
with humanitarian aid and a team of doctors headed to Italy to fly over its
airspace’, the EC Vice-President Yourova´ said.
Actually, the studies regarding dis/mis/information diffusion on social media
seldom analyse its effective impact. In the exchange of messages on online
platforms, a great amount of interactions do not carry any relevant information
for the understanding of the phenomenon: as an example, randomly retweeting
viral posts does not contribute to insights on the sharing activity of the account.
For determining dis/misinformation propagation two main weapons can be used,
the analysis of the content (semantic approach) and the analysis of the
communities sharing the same piece of information (topological approach). While
the content of a message can be analysed on its own, the presence of some
troublesome structure in the pattern of news producer and spreaders (i.e., in the
topology of contacts) can be detected only trough dedicated instruments. Indeed,
for real in-depth analyses, the properties of the real system should be compared
with a proper null model. Recently, entropy-based null models have been
successfully employed to filter out random noise from complex networks and focus
the attention on non trivial contributions [10, 26]. Essentially, the method consists
in defining a ‘network benchmark’ that has some of the (topological) properties of
the real system, but is completely random for all the rest. Then, every observation
that does not agree with the model, i.e., cannot be explained by the topological
properties of the benchmark, carries non trivial information. Notably, being based
on the Shannon entropy, the benchmark is unbiased by definition.
In the present paper, using entropy-based null-models, we analyse a tweet corpus
related to the Italian debate on Covid-19 during the two months of maximum
crisis in Italy. After cleaning the system from the random noise, by using the
entropy-based null-model as a filter, we have been able to highlight different
communities. Interestingly enough, these groups, beside including several official
accounts of ministries, health institutions, and - online and offline - newspapers
and newscasts, encompass four main political groups. While at first sight this may
sound surprising - the pandemic debate was more on a scientific than on a
political ground, at least in the very first phase of its abrupt diffusion -, it might
be due to pre-existing echo chambers [18].
The four political groups are found to perform completely different activities on
the platform, to interact differently from each other, and to post and share
reputable and non reputable sources of information with great differences in the
number of their occurrences. In particular, the accounts from the right wing
community interact, mainly in terms of retweets, with the same accounts who
interact with the mainstream media. This is probably due to the strong visibility
given by the mainstream media to the leaders of that community. Moreover, the
right wing community is more numerous and more active, even relatively to the
number of accounts involved, than the other communities. Interestingly enough,
newly formed political parties, as the one of the former Italian prime Minister
Matteo Renzi, quickly imposed their presence on Twitter and on the online
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political debate, with a strong activity. Furthermore, the different political parties
use different sources for getting information on the spreading on the pandemics.
To detect the impact of dis/misinformation in the debate, we consider the news
sources shared among the accounts of the various groups. With a hybrid
annotation approach, based on independent fact checking organisations and
human annotation, we categorised such sources as reputable and non reputable (in
terms of credibility of the published news and the transparency of the sources).
Notably, we experienced that a group of accounts spread information from non
reputable sources with a frequency almost 10 times higher than that of the other
political groups. And we are afraid that, due to the extent of the online activity of
the members of this community, the spreading of such a volume of non reputable
news could deceit public opinion.
2 Dataset
Keywords and Hashtags
coronavirus
ncov
covid
SARS-CoV2
#coronavirus
#coronaviruses
#WuhanCoronavirus
#CoronavirusOutbreak
#coronaviruschina
#coronaviruswuhan
#ChinaCoronaVirus
#nCoV
#ChinaWuHan
#nCoV2020
#nCov2019
#covid2019
#covid-19
#SARS CoV 2
#SARSCoV2
#COVID19
Table 1 Keywords and Hashtags which drove the data collection phase
We collected circa 4.5M tweets in Italian language, from February 21st to April
20th 2020[2]. Details about the political situation in Italy during the period of data
collection can be found in the Supplementary Material, Section 1.1: ‘Evolution of
the Covid-19 pandemics in Italy’. The data collection was keyword-based, with
keywords related the Covid-19 pandemics.
Twitter’s streaming API returns any tweet containing the keyword(s) in the text
of the tweet, as well as in its metadata. It is worth noting that it is not always
necessary to have each permutation of a specific keyword in the tracking list. For
example, the keyword ‘Covid’ will return tweets that contain both ‘Covid19’ and
‘Covid-19’. Table 1 lists a subset of the considered keywords and hashtags. There
are some hashtags that overlap due to the fact that an included keyword is a
sub-string of another one, but we included both for completeness.
[2]We had an interruption of one day and 4 hours on February 27th and another of
three days and 8 hours on March 10th due to a connection breakdown.
Page 4 of 22
Figure 1 Political affiliation of users: communities (left panel) and subcommunities (right panel)
3 Results
3.1 Discursive communities of verified users
The left panel of Fig. 1 shows the network obtained by following the projection
procedure described in Section 5.1. The network resulting from the projection
procedure will be called, in the rest of the paper, validated network. The term
validated should not be confused with the term verified, which instead denotes a
Twitter user who has passed the formal authentication procedure by the social
platform.
In order to get the community of verified Twitter users, we applied the Louvain
algorithm [5] to the data in the validated network. Such an algorithm, despite
being one of the most popular, is also known to be order dependent [19]. To get
rid of this bias, we apply it iteratively N times (N being the number of the nodes)
after reshuffling the order of the nodes. Finally, we select the partition with the
highest modularity. The network presents a strong community structure,
composed by four main subgraphs. When analysing the emerging 4 communities,
we find that they correspond to
1 Right wing parties and media (in steel blue)
2 Center left wing (dark red)
3 5 Stars Movement (M5S ), in dark orange
4 Institutional accounts (in sky blue)
Details about the political situation in Italy during the period of data collection
can be found in the Supplementary Material, Section 1.2: ‘Italian political
situation during the Covid-19 pandemics’.
This partition in four subgroups, once examined in more details, presents a richer
substructure, described in the right panel of Fig. 1.
Starting from the center-left wing, we can find a darker red community, including
various NGOs and various left oriented journalists, VIPs and pundits. A slightly
lighter red sub-community turns out to be composed by the main politicians of
the Italian Democratic Party (PD), as well as by representatives from the
European Parliament (Italian and others) and some EU commissioners. The violet
red group is mostly composed by the representatives of Italia Viva, a new party
founded by the former Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi (December 2014 -
February 2016). In golden red we can find the subcommunity of Catholic and
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Vatican groups. Finally the dark violet red and light tomato subcommunities
consist mainly of journalists.
In turn, also the orange (M5S) community shows a clear partition in substructures.
In particular, the dark orange subcommunity contains the accounts of politicians,
parliament representatives and ministers of the M5S and journalists. In
aquamarine, we can find the official accounts of some private and public, national
and international, health institutes. Finally, in the Light Slate Blue subcommunity
we can find various Italian ministers as well as the Italian police and army forces.
Similar considerations apply to the steel blue community. In steel blue, the
subcommunity of center right and right wing parties (as Forza Italia, Lega and
Fratelli d’Italia). In the following, this subcommunity is going to be called as
FI-L-FdI, recalling the initials of the political parties contributing to this group.
The sky blue subcommunity includes the national federations of various sports,
the official accounts of athletes and sport players (mostly soccer) and their teams.
The teal subcommunity contains the main Italian news agencies. In this
subcommunity there are also the accounts of many universities. The firebrick
subcommunity contains accounts related to the AS Roma football club;
analogously in dark red official accounts of AC Milan and its players. The slate
blue subcommunity is mainly composed by the official accounts of radio and TV
programs of Mediaset, the main private Italian broadcasting company.
Finally, the sky blue community is mainly composed by Italian embassies around
the world.
For the sake of completeness, a more detailed description of the composition of the
subcommunities in the right panel of Figure 1 is reported in the Supplementary
Material, Section 1.3: ‘Composition of the subcommunities in the validated
network of verified Twitter users’.
3.2 Domain names’ analysis of verified users
Here, we report a series of analyses related to the domain names, hereafter simply
called domains, that mostly appear in all the tweets of the validated network of
verified users. The domains have been tagged according to their degree of
credibility and transparency, as indicated by the independent software toolkit
NewsGuard https://www.newsguardtech.com/. The details of this procedure are
reported below.
As a first step, we considered the network of verified accounts, whose communities
and sub-communities are shown in Fig. 1. On this topology, we labelled all
domains that had been shared at least 20 times (between tweets and retweets).
Table 2 shows the tags associated to the domains. In the rest of the paper, we
shall be interested in quantifying reliability of news sources publishing during the
period of interest. Thus, for our analysis, we will not consider those sources
corresponding to social networks, marketplaces, search engines, institutional sites,
etc. Tags R, ∼ R and NR in Table 2 are used only for news sites, be them
newspapers, magazines, TV or radio social channels, and they stand for Reputable,
Quasi Reputable, Not Reputable, respectively. Label UNC is assigned to those
domains with less than 20 occurrences in ours tweets and rewteets dataset.
In fact, the labeling procedure is a hybrid one. As mentioned above, we relied on
NewsGuard, a plugin resulting from the joint effort of journalists and software
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label description
R Reputable news source
∼ R Quasi Reputable news source
NR Not Reputable news source
S social network
F fundraiser and petition site
M marketplace
P official journal of a political party
IS institutional site
ST online streaming platform
SE search engine
UNC unclassified
Table 2 Tags used for labeling the domains
developers aiming at evaluating news sites according to nine criteria concerning
credibility and transparency. For evaluating the credibility level, the metrics
consider whether the news source regularly publishes false news, does not
distinguish between facts and opinions, does not correct a wrongly reported news.
For transparency, instead, the tool takes into account whether owners, founders or
authors of the news source are publicly known; and whether advertisements are
easily recognizable[3]. After combining the individual scores obtained out of the
nine criteria, the plugin associates to a news source a score from 1 to 100, where
60 is the minimum score for the source to be considered reliable. When reporting
the results, the plugin provides details about the criteria which passed the test
and those that did not. In order to have a sort of no-man’s land and not to be too
abrupt in the transition between reputability and non-reputability, when the score
was between 55 and 65, we considered the source to be quasi reputable, ∼R.
It is worth noting that not all the domains in the dataset under investigation were
evaluated by NewsGuard at the time of our analysis. For those not evaluated
automatically, the annotation was made by three tech-savvy researchers, who
assessed the domains by using the same criteria as NewsGuard.
Table 3 gives statistics about number and kind of tweets (tw = pure tweet; rt =
retweet), the number of url and distinct url (dist url), the number of domains and
users in the validated network of verified users. We clarify what we mean by these
terms with an example: a domain for us corresponds to the so-called ‘second-level
domain’ name[4], i.e., the name directly to the left of .com, .net, and any other
top-level domains. For instance, repubblica.it, corriere.it, nytimes.com are
considered domains by us. Instead, the url maintains here its standard definition[5]
and an example is http://www.example.com/index.html.
Table 4 shows the outcome of the domains annotation, according to the scores of
NewsGuard or to those assigned by the three annotators, when scores were no
available from NewsGuard.
At a first glance, the majority of the news domains belong to the Reputable
category. The second highest percentage is the one of the untagged domains –
UNC. In fact, in our dataset there are many domains that occur only few times
once. For example, there are 300 domains that appear in the datasets only once.
Fig. 2 shows the trend of the number of tweets and retweets, containing urls,
posted by the verified users of the validated projection during the period of data
[3]NewsGuard rating process: https://www.newsguardtech.com/ratings/rating-process-criteria/
[4]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name
[5]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/URL
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type #post #url #dist url #domain #user
tw+rt 63467 46891 37930 1833 1631
tw 46277 37095 32605 1168 1115
rt 17190 9796 7504 1178 1385
Table 3 Posts, urls, domains and users statistics in the whole dataset – validated network of verified
users.
type #url R ∼R NR S F M P IS ST SE UNC
tw+rt 46891 68.3 1.1 1.5 3.8 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.0 24.1
tw 37095 71.0 1.1 1.7 3.2 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 22.1
rt 9796 57.9 1.2 1.1 6.2 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.0 31.9
Table 4 Annotation results over all the domains in the whole dataset – validated network of verified
users.
Figure 2 Domains’ spreading over time – verified users
collection. The figure presents a quite jagged trend, with higher peaks in the first
period of the emergency, in particular from the first hospitalization in the
Lombardy region, the most affected region in Italy, to the closure of schools
(March 5, 2020), to the beginning of the lockdown (officially declared on Monday,
March 9, 2020). Then, there are peaks of discussion in conjunction with events
such as the near collapse of intensive care due to the very high number of
hospitalized patients. These results are in line with similar work, such as the study,
for several countries, of the online discussions about the virus, see Ref. in [9].
Going on with the analysis, Table 5 shows the percentage of the different types of
domains for the 4 communities identified in the left plot of Fig. 1.
It is worth observing that the steel blue community (both politicians and media)
is the most active one, even if it is not the most represented: the number of users
is lower than the one of the center left community (the biggest one, in terms of
numbers), but the number of their posts containing a valid url is almost the
double of that of the second more active community. Interestingly, the activity of
the verified users of the steel blue community is more focused on content
production of (see the only tweets sub-table) than in sharing (see the only
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Community #url R ∼R NR S F M P IS ST SE UNC
steelblue 24510 74.0 0.9 2.8 3.4 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.2
dark red 12748 76.9 2.0 0.1 2.2 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 17.7
dark orange 5639 49.0 0.3 0.5 7.1 0.2 0.0 0.8 1.5 0.5 0.0 40.1
sky blue 2157 52.4 0.7 0.0 9.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 36.9
only tweets
steelblue 22029 74.5 0.9 2.7 3.3 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.8
dark red 9185 79.0 2.0 0.1 1.6 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 16.3
dark orange 3437 54.1 0.2 0.2 6.1 0.1 0.0 0.9 1.6 0.3 0.0 36.5
sky blue 1106 65.8 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.9
only retweets
steelblue 2481 69.7 0.9 3.2 4.4 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.3
dark red 3563 71.4 1.9 0.1 3.7 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 21.3
dark orange 2202 41.0 0.5 0.9 8.7 0.4 0.0 0.6 1.4 0.7 0.0 45.8
sky blue 1051 38.3 1.5 0.1 12.7 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.1 46.1
Table 5 Annotation per communities – validated network of verified users.
Community #post #url #dist url #domain #user
steelblue 30877 24510 20718 648 417
dark red 17202 12748 10999 744 452
dark orange 8990 5639 4389 640 316
sky blue 3897 2157 1626 348 149
only tweets
steelblue 26359 22029 19222 467 297
dark red 11275 9185 8435 430 329
dark orange 5240 3437 3042 351 245
sky blue 1738 1106 964 143 114
only retweets
steelblue 4518 2481 2175 348 328
dark red 5927 3563 3050 483 399
dark orange 3750 2202 1633 423 264
sky blue 2159 1051 740 269 147
Table 6 Posts, urls, domains and users statistics per communities – validated network of verified
users.
retweets sub-table). In fact, retweets represent almost 14.6% of all posts from the
media and the right wing community, while in the case of the center-left
community it is 34.5%. This effect is observable even in the average only tweets
post per verified user: a right-wing user and a media user have an average of 88.75
original posts, against 34.27 for center-left-wing users. These numbers are
probably due to the presence in the former community of the Italian most
accessed media. They tend to spread their (original) pieces of news on the Twitter
platform. Interestingly, the presence of urls from a non reputable source in the
steel blue community is more than 10 times higher than the second score in the
same field in the case of original tweets (only tweets). It is worth noting that, for
the case of the dark orange and sky blue communities, which are smaller both in
terms of users and number of posts, the presence of non classified sources is quite
strong (it represents nearly 46% of retweeted posts for both the communities), as
it is the frequency of posts linking to social network contents. Interestingly
enough, the verified users of both groups seem to focus slightly more on the same
domains: there are, on average, 1.59 and 1.80 posts for each url domain
respectively for the dark orange and sky blue communities, and, on average, 1.26
and 1.34 posts for the steel blue and the dark red communities.
The right plot in Fig. 1 report a fine grained division of communities: the four
largest communities have been further divided into sub-communities, as
mentioned in Subsection 3.1. Here, we focus on the URLs shared in the purely
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political sub-communities in Table 7. Broadly speaking, we examine the
contribution of the different political parties, as represented on Twitter, to the
spread of mis/disinformation and propaganda.
Table 7 clearly shows how the vast majority of the news coming from sources
considered scarce or non reputable are tweeted and retweeted by the steel blue
political sub-community (FI-L-FdI). Notably, the percentage of non reputable
sources shared by the FI-L-FdI accounts is more than 4 times the percentage of
their community (the steel blue one) and it is more than 30 times the second
community in the NR ratio ranking. For all the political sub-communities the
incidence of social network links is much higher than in their original communities.
Sub-community #url R ∼R NR S F M P IS ST SE UNC
FI-L-FdI 4759 56.4 2.3 12.8 14.5 0.1 0.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.8
Movimento 5 Stelle 2385 75.5 0.1 0.4 6.6 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.1 0.0 14.4
Italia Viva 857 25.3 26.6 0.1 10.0 0.7 0.1 8.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 28.3
Partito Democratico 643 64.4 0.6 0.3 9.2 0.8 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.2 20.9
only tweets
FI-L-FdI 4177 59.0 2.1 13.0 14.6 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.8
Movimento 5 Stelle 1839 79.4 0.1 0.4 6.3 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.6 0.0 11.5
Italia Viva 458 19.2 39.1 0.2 9.0 0.2 0.2 11.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.7
Partito Democratico 370 71.9 0.5 0.5 5.4 1.1 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 16.8
only retweets
FI-L-FdI 582 38.0 3.4 11.7 14.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.2
Movimento 5 Stelle 546 62.3 0.2 0.4 7.9 0.2 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.9 0.0 23.5
Italia Viva 399 32.3 12.3 0.0 11.3 1.3 0.0 5.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 36.8
Partito Democratico 273 54.2 0.7 0.0 14.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.4 26.7
Table 7 Domains annotation per political sub-communities – validated network of verified users
Sub-community #post #url #dist url #domain #user
FI-L-FdI 6618 4759 4172 294 85
Movimento 5 Stelle 3403 2385 2098 200 142
Italia Viva 1991 857 725 202 90
Partito Democratico 1483 643 595 137 97
only tweets
FI-L-FdI 5031 4177 3728 210 62
Movimento 5 Stelle 2406 1839 1742 139 103
Italia Viva 943 458 417 96 69
Partito Democratico 736 370 353 74 60
only retweets
FI-L-FdI 1587 582 510 151 72
Movimento 5 Stelle 997 546 469 104 103
Italia Viva 1048 399 348 147 82
Partito Democratico 747 273 258 94 88
Table 8 Posts, urls, domains and users statistics per political sub-communities – validated network of
verified users.
Looking at Table 8, even if the number of users in each political sub-community is
much smaller, some peculiar behaviours can be still be observed. Again, the
center-right and right wing parties, while representing the least represented ones
in terms of users, are much more active than the other groups: each (verified) user
is responsible, on average of almost 81.14 messages, while the average is 23.96,
22.12 and 15.29 for M5S, IV and PD, respectively. It is worth noticing that Italia
Viva, while being a recently founded party, is very active; moreover, for them the
frequency of quasi reputable sources is quite high, especially in the case of only
tweets posts. The impact of uncategorized sources is almost constant for all
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communities in the retweeting activity, while it is particularly strong for the M5S.
Finally, the posts by the center left communities (i.e., Italia Viva and the
Democratic Party) tend to have more than one url. Specifically, every post
containing at least a url, has, on average, 2.05 and 2.73 urls respectively, against
the 1.31 of Movimento 5 Stelle and 1.20 for the center-right and right wing parties.
To conclude the analysis on the validated network of verified users, we report
statistics about the most diffused hashtags in the 4 political sub-communities.
Fig. 3 focuses on wordclouds, while Fig. 4 reports the data under an histograms
form. Actually, from the various hashtags we can derive important information
regarding the communications of the various political discursive communities and
their position towards the management of the pandemics. First, it has to be
noticed that the M5S is the greatest user of hashtags: their two most used
hashtags have been used almost twice the most used hashtags used by the PD, for
instance. This heavy usage is probably due to the presence in this community of
journalists and of the official account of Il Fatto Quotidiano, a newspaper
explicitly supporting the M5S: indeed, the first two hashtags are
“#ilfattoquotidiano” and “#edicola” (kiosk, in Italian).
It is interesting to see the relative importance of hashtags intended to encourage
the population during the lockdown: it is the case of “#celafaremo” (we will make
it), “#iorestoacasa” (I am staying home), “#fermiamoloinsieme” (Let’s stop it
together): “#iorestoacasa” is present in every community, but it ranks 13th in the
M5S verified user community, 29th in the FI-L-FdI community, 2nd in the Italia
Viva community and 10th in the PD one. Remarkably, “#celafaremo” is present
only in the M5S group, as “#fermiamoloinsieme” can be found in the top 30
hashtags only in the center-right and right wing cluster. The PD, being present in
various European institutions, mentions more European related hashtags
(“#europeicontrocovid19”, Europeans against covid-19 ), in order to ask for a
common reaction of the EU. The center-right and right wing community has other
hashtags as “#forzalombardia” (Go, Lombardy! ), ranking the 2nd, and
“#fermiamoloinsieme”, ranking 10th. What is, nevertheless, astonishing, is the
presence among the most used hashtags of all communities of the name of
politicians from the same group (‘interestingly ‘#salvini” is the first used hashtag
in the center right and right wing community, even if he did not perform any duty
in the government), TV programs (“#mattino5”, “#lavitaindiretta”, “#ctcf”,
“#dimarted`ı”), as if the main usage of hashtags is to promote the appearance of
politicians in TV programs. Finally, the hashtags used by FI-L-FdI are mainly
used to criticise the actions of the government, e.g., “#contedimettiti” (Conte,
resign! ).
3.3 The validated retweet network
Fig. 5 shows the structure of the directed validated projection of the retweet
activity network, as outcome of the procedure recalled in Section 3 of the
Supplementary Material. As mentioned in Section 4 of the Supplementary
Material, the affiliation of unverified users has been determined using the tags
obtained by the validated projected network of the verified users, as immutable
label for the label propagation of [23].
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Figure 3 Wordclouds of the mostly diffused 40 hashtags in the validated network of verified users.
Political sub-communities. Top-left: right-wing. Top-right: 5 star movement. Bottom-left: Italia
Viva (center-left). Bottom-right: Democratic Party (center-left).
Figure 4 The 30 mostly diffused hashtags in the political sub-communities. Top-left =
center-right wing; Top-right = 5 Stars Movement; Bottom-left = Italia Viva (center-left);
Bottom-right = Democratic Party (center-left)
After label propagation, the representation of the political communities in the
validated retweet network changes dramatically with respect to the case of the
network of verified users: the center-right and right wing community is the most
represented community in the whole network, with 11063 users (representing
21.1% of all the users in the validated network), followed by Italia Viva users with
8035 accounts (15.4% of all the accounts in the validated network). The impact of
M5S and PD is much more limited, with, respectively, 3286 and 564 accounts. It is
worth noting that this result is unexpected, due to the recent formation of Italia
Viva.
As in our previous study targeting the online propaganda [8], we observe that the
most effective users in term of hub score [21] are almost exclusively from the
center-right and right wing party: Considering the first 100 hubs, only 4 are not
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from this group. Interestingly, 3 out of these 4 are verified users: Roberto Burioni,
one of the most famous Italian virologists, ranking 32nd, Agenzia Ansa, a popular
Italian news agency, ranking 61st, and Tgcom24, the popular newscast of a private
TV channel, ranking 73rd. The fourth account is an online news website, ranking
88th: this is a not verified account which belongs to a not political community.
Remarkably, in the top 5 hubs we find 3 of the top 5 hubs already found when
considered the online debate on migrations from northern Africa to Italy [8]: in
particular, a journalist of a neo-fascist online newspaper (non verified user), an
extreme right activist (non verified user) and the leader of Fratelli d’Italia Giorgia
Meloni (verified user), who ranks 3rd in the hub score. Matteo Salvini (verified
user), who was the first hub in [8], ranks 9th, surpassed by his party partner
Claudio Borghi, ranking 6th. The first hub in the present network is an extreme
right activist, posting videos against African migrants to Italy and accusing them
to be responsible of the contagion and of violating lockdown measures.
3.3.1 Domain analysis on the directed validated network
Table 9 shows the annotation results of all the domains tweeted and retweeted by
users in the directed validated network. The numbers are much higher than those
shown in Table 2, but the trend confirms the previous results. The majority of urls
traceable to news sources are considered reputable. The number of unclassified
domains is higher too. In fact, in this case, the annotation was made considering
the domains occurring at least 100 times.
Figure 5 The directed validated projection of the retweet activity network.
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type #url R ∼R NR S F M P IS ST SE UNC
tw+rt 1278883 47.5 8.4 8.6 3.8 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.1 30.5
tw 396416 39.1 11.4 7.8 2.9 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 38.3
rt 882467 51.2 7.1 8.9 4.3 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.2 26.9
Table 9 Annotation results over all the domains – directed validated network
Table 10 reports statistics about posts, urls, distinct urls, users and verified users
in the directed validated network. Noticeably, by comparing these numbers with
those of Table 3, reporting statistics about the validated network of verified users,
we can see that here the number of retweets is much more higher, and the trend is
the opposite: verified users tend to tweet more than retweet (46277 vs 17190),
while users in the directed validated network, which comprehends also non verified
users, have a number of retweets 3.5 times higher than the number of their tweets.
Fig. 6 shows the trend of the number of tweets containing urls over the period of
data collection. Since we are analysing a bigger network than the one considered
in Section 3.2, we have numbers that are one order of magnitude greater than
those shown in Fig. 2; the highest peak, after the discovery of the first cases in
Lombardy, corresponds to more than 68,000 posts containing urls, whereas the
analogous peak in Fig. 2 corresponds to 2,500 posts. Apart from the order of
magnitudes, the two plots feature similar trends: higher traffic before the
beginning of the Italian lockdown, and a settling down as the quarantine went
on[6].
Type #post #url #dist url #domain #user #verif
tw+rt 2840753 1278883 376384 13985 52161 1050
tw 643078 396416 292621 9844 30915 966
rt 2197675 882467 160438 10796 49135 819
Table 10 Posts, urls, domains and users statistics in the whole dataset – directed validated network.
Table 11 shows the core of our analysis, that is, the distribution of reputable and
non reputable news sources in the direct validated network, consisting of both
verified and non-verified users. Again, we focus directly on the 4 political
sub-communities identified in the previous subsection. Two of the sub-communities
are part of the center-left wing community, one is associated to the 5 Stars
Movement, the remaining one represents center-right and right wing communities.
In line with previous results on the validated network of verified users, the table
clearly shows how the vast majority of the news coming from sources considered
scarce or non reputable are tweeted and retweeted by the center-right and right
wing communities; 98% of the domains tagged as NR are shared by them.
As shown in Table 12, the activity of FI-L-FdI users is again extremely high: on
average there are 89.3 retweets per account in this community, against the 66.4 of
M5S, the 48.4 of IV and the 21.8 of PD. The right wing contribution to the debate
is extremely high, even in absolute numbers, due to the the large number of users
in this community. It is worth mentioning that the frequency of non reputable
sources in this community is really high (at about 30% of the urls in the only
tweets) and comparable with that of the reputable ones (see Table 11, only
[6]The low peaks for February 27 and March 10 are due to an interruption in the
data collection, caused by a connection breakdown.
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Figure 6 Domains’ spreading over time – validated directed network
Sub-community #url R ∼R NR S F M P IS ST SE UNC
FI-L-FdI 457746 38.3 12.1 22.1 4.7 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 22.1
Italia Viva 155125 58.7 6.7 0.7 3.6 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 28.5
Movimento 5 Stelle 120244 63.8 1.4 3.1 4.7 0.2 0.0 2.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 23.8
Partito Democratico 6183 47.5 1.5 0.4 5.9 1.0 0.0 0.1 2.9 0.0 0.0 40.7
only tweets
FI-L-FdI 95902 29.5 9.6 30.6 4.7 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.2
Italia Viva 33648 47.8 14.4 1.1 2.9 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.8
Movimento 5 Stelle 22940 56.3 1.4 2.7 3.9 0.5 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 33.7
Partito Democratico 1759 35.6 0.9 0.2 3.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 57.8
only retweets
FI-L-FdI 361844 40.7 12.8 19.9 4.8 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 20.9
Italia Viva 121477 61.8 4.6 0.6 3.7 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 27.3
Movimento 5 Stelle 97304 65.5 1.4 3.2 4.9 0.2 0.0 3.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 21.4
Partito Democratico 4424 52.2 1.7 0.5 6.8 1.0 0.0 0.1 3.6 0.0 0.0 34.1
Table 11 Domains annotation per political sub-communities – directed validated network
tweets). In the other sub-communities, PD users are more focused on
un-categorised sources, while users from both Italia Viva and Movimento 5 Stelle
are mostly tweeting and retweeting reputable news sources.
Table 13 offers another point of view. The #user column shows the number of
users of the 4 different political sub-communities who share urls labelled as NR. In
absolute numbers, the FI-L-FdI community sends out the highest number of NR
domains, with more than 20 times the sum of posts sent by both IV and M5S
sub-communities. Moreover, in the FI-L-FdI community the average number of
(original) NR posts sent per user is 32.21, which is almost 6 times the average for
the M5S users (which has 5.38 NR posts per users); IV and PD have 4.48 and 1.00
as average, respectively. The frequency of accounts retweeting NR sources among
all users from the same community is extremely high too for FI-L-FdI (57.6% for
FI-L-FdI, 23.5% for M5S, 5.79% for IV and 2.5% for PD - percentages for the
only tweets activity being similar). It thus appears that FI-L-FdI contribute
much to the diffusion of dis/misinformation, in relation to the numbers of posts
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Community #post #url #dist url #domain #user #verif
FI-L-FdI 1135885 457746 101299 5560 11055 59
Italia Viva 461452 155125 55766 4786 8031 60
Movimento 5 Stelle 250033 120244 39099 3185 3282 102
Partito Democratico 14764 6183 4443 783 564 55
only tweets
FI-L-FdI 176137 95902 63710 3272 6831 56
Italia Viva 82356 33648 25364 2243 4976 56
Movimento 5 Stelle 41838 22940 17747 1536 1974 92
Partito Democratico 3247 1759 1671 277 337 51
only retweets
FI-L-FdI 959748 361844 54768 4304 10749 48
Italia Viva 379096 121477 37084 3915 7827 52
Movimento 5 Stelle 208195 97304 27692 2647 3135 72
Partito Democratico 11517 4424 3079 683 528 44
Table 12 Posts, urls, domains and users statistics per political sub-communities – directed validated
network.
Sub-community #post #url #domain #distinct url #user
only tweets
FI-L-FdI 29278 29324 20 20059 909
Italia Viva 377 378 16 354 84
Movimento 5 Stelle 608 608 13 448 113
Partito Democratico 3 3 3 3 3
only retweets
FI-L-FdI 71613 71892 20 4611 6191
Italia Viva 719 719 20 485 453
Movimento 5 Stelle 3102 3105 19 988 736
Partito Democratico 24 24 6 23 13
Table 13 Share of dissemination of NR domains for each of the 4 sub-communities – directed
validated network.
and users, but also in absolute numbers: out of the over 1M tweets, more than
320k tweets refer to a NR url.
Figure 7 The 30 mostly diffused hashtags in the political sub-communities, directed validated
network. Top-left = center-right wing; Top-right = 5 Stars Movement; Bottom-left = Italia Viva
(center-left); Bottom-right = Democratic Party (center-left)
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Figure 7 shows the top 30 shared hashtags, for the various political communities:
the scales are different due to the different activity of the various groups.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider the most used hashtags in the various
communities in order to have an idea of the standings of the different parties. The
opposition, represented by the FI-L-FdI community, show their dissatisfaction of
the management of the pandemics by using hashtags like ‘#contedimettiti’
(Conte, resign! ), ‘#governodellavergogna’ (government of the disgrace),
‘#governodelcontagio’ (government of the contagion) and ‘#vogliamovotare’ (we
want to vote).
Actually, the political competition still shines through the hashtag usage even for
the other communities: it is the case, for instance, of Italia Viva. In the top 30
hashtags we can find ‘#salvini’, ‘#lega’, but also ‘#papeete’[7], ‘#salvinisciacallo’
(Salvini jackal) and ‘#salvinimmmerda’ (Salvini asshole). On the other hand, in
Italia Viva hashtags supporting the population during the lockdown are used:
‘#iorestoacasa’, ‘#restoacasa’ (I am staying home), ‘#restiamoacasa’ (let’s stay
home). Criticisms towards the management of Lombardy health system during the
pandemics can be deduced from the hashtag ‘#commissariamtelalombardia’ (put
Lombardy under receivership) and ‘#fontana’ (the Lega administrator of the
Lombardy region).
Movimento 5 Stelle has the name of the main leader of the opposition ‘#salvini’,
as first hashtag and supports criticisms to the Lombardy Administration with the
hashtags ‘#fontanadimettiti’ (Fontana, resign! ) and ‘#gallera’, the Health and
Welfare Minister of the Lombardy Region, considered the main responsible for the
bad management of the pandemics. Nevertheless, it is possible to highlight even
some hashtags encouraging the population during the lock down, as the above
mentioned ‘#iorestoacasa’, ‘#restoacasa’ and ‘#restiamoacasa’. It is worth
mentioning that the government measures, and the corresponding M5S
campaigns, are accompanied specific hashtags: ‘#curaitalia’ is the name of one of
the decree of the prime minister to inject liquidity in the Italian economy,
‘#acquistaitaliano’ (buy Italian products! ), instead, advertise Italian products to
support the national economy.
As a final task, over the whole set of tweets produced or shared by the users in the
directed validated network, we counted the number of times a message containing
a url was shared by users belonging to different political communities, although
without considering the semantics of the tweets. Namely, we ignored whether the
urls were shared to support or to oppose the presented arguments.
Table 14 shows the most tweeted (and retweeted) NR domains shared by the
political communities presented in Table 7, the number of occurrences is reported
next to each domain.
[7]Matteo Salvini, while minister of Internal Affairs, prepared the political crisis
in 2019 from the Papeete Beach resort in Milano Marittima, Italy (Il Sole 24Ore,
Salvini, dal Papeete all’opposizione: l’agosto terribile del “capitano”, 1st September 2019). His
staying was advertised by a huge TV and social media covering and marked as a
lack of respect towards the Republican institutions by his opponents. Instead, his
supporters admired his closeness to the population.
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The first NR domains for FI-L-FdI in Table 14 are related to the right, extreme
right and neo-fascist propaganda, as it is the case of imolaoggi.it,
ilprimatonazionale.it and voxnews.info, recognised as disinformation websites by
NewsGuard and by the two main Italian debunker websites, bufale.net and
BUTAC.it.
As shown in the table, some domains, although in different number of occurrences,
are present under more than one column, thus shared by users close to different
political communities. This could mean, for some subgroups of the community, a
retweet with the aim of supporting the opinions expressed in the original tweets.
However, since the semantics of the posts in which these domains are present were
not investigated, the retweets of the links by more than one political community
could be due to contrast, and not to support, the opinions present in the original
posts.
Table 14 List of the most frequent NR domains, with relative occurrences, per political
subcommunities. The count was made considering both tweets and retweets (and not
replies), for users of the direct validated network. The top sub-table does consider quoted
tweets, while the bottom does not. The table reports only the domains tagged as ‘Non
Reputable’ by NewsGuard.
steel blue violet red dark orange dark red
imolaoggi.it 16021 dagospia.com 314 lantidiplomatico.it 1110 it.sputniknews.com 2
ilprimatonazionale.it 15352 m.dagospia.com 131 m.dagospia.com 282 dagospia.com 2
voxnews.info 9299 imolaoggi.it 109 dagospia.com 266 laverita.info 1
stopcensura.info 8438 lantidiplomatico.it 72 it.sputniknews.com 95 lantidiplomatico.it 1
laverita.info 2645 ilprimatonazionale.it 55 imolaoggi.it 89 m.dagospia.com 1
stopcensura.org 2406 it.sputniknews.com 44 ilprimatonazionale.it 85 - -
m.dagospia.com 2073 stopcensura.info 28 stopcensura.info 65 - -
scenarieconomici.it 1613 agenpress.it 25 voxnews.info 46 - -
it.sputniknews.com 1304 voxnews.info 23 agenpress.it 35 - -
dagospia.com 1283 laverita.info 19 stopcensura.org 21 - -
lantidiplomatico.it 1234 scenarieconomici.it 13 laverita.info 10 - -
agenpress.it 1117 stopcensura.org 8 scenarieconomici.it 7 - -
lavocedelpatriota.it 985 lavocedelpatriota.it 6 lavocedelpatriota.it 2 - -
not including quoted tweets
imolaoggi.it 16010 dagospia.com 314 lantidiplomatico.it 1101 it.sputniknews.com 2
ilprimatonazionale.it 15335 m.dagospia.com 131 m.dagospia.com 282 dagospia.com 2
voxnews.info 9280 imolaoggi.it 109 dagospia.com 266 laverita.info 1
stopcensura.info 8436 lantidiplomatico.it 71 it.sputniknews.com 95 lantidiplomatico.it 1
laverita.info 2642 ilprimatonazionale.it 55 imolaoggi.it 89 m.dagospia.com 1
stopcensura.org 2406 it.sputniknews.com 44 ilprimatonazionale.it 85 - -
m.dagospia.com 2067 stopcensura.info 28 stopcensura.info 65 - -
scenarieconomici.it 1599 agenpress.it 25 voxnews.info 46 - -
it.sputniknews.com 1302 voxnews.info 23 agenpress.it 35 - -
dagospia.com 1282 laverita.info 19 stopcensura.org 21 - -
lantidiplomatico.it 1232 scenarieconomici.it 13 laverita.info 10 - -
agenpress.it 1117 stopcensura.org 8 scenarieconomici.it 7 - -
lavocedelpatriota.it 985 lavocedelpatriota.it 6 lavocedelpatriota.it 2 - -
4 Discussion
Despite the fact that the results were achieved for a specific country, we believe
that the applied methodology is of general interest, being able to show trends and
peculiarities whenever information is exchanged on social networks. In particular,
when analysing the outcome of our investigation, some features attracted our
attention:
1 Persistence of clusters wrt different discussion topics: In Caldarelli et al. [8],
we focused on tweets concerned with immigration, an issue that has been
central in the Italian political debate for years. Here, we discovered that the
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clusters and the echo chambers that have been detected when analysing
tweets about immigration are almost the same as those singled out when
considering discussions concerned with Covid-19. This may seem surprising,
because a discussion about Covid-19 may not be exclusively political, but
also medical, social, economic, etc.. From this we can argue that the clusters
are political in nature and, even when the topic of discussion changes, users
remain in their cluster on Twitter. (Indeed, journalists and politicians use
Twitter for information and political propaganda, respectively). The reasons
political polarisation and political vision of the world affect so strongly also
the analysis of what should be an objective phenomenon is still an intriguing
question.
2 Persistence of online behavioral characteristics of clusters: We found that
the most active, lively and penetrating online communities in the online
debate on Covid-19 are the same found in [8], formed in a almost purely
political debate such as the one represented by the right of migrants to land
on the Italian territory.
3 (Dis)Similarities amongst offline and online behaviours of members and
voters of parties: Maybe less surprisingly, the political habits is also reflected
in the degree of participation to the online discussions. In particular, among
the parties in the centre-left-wing side, a small party (Italia Viva) shows a
much more effective social presence than the larger party of the Italian
centre-left-wing (Partito Democratico), which has many more active
members and more parliamentary representation. More generally, there is a
significant difference in social presence among the different political parties,
and the amount of activity is not at all proportional to the size of the parties
in terms of members and voters.
4 Spread of non reputable news sources: In the online debate about Covid-19,
many links to non reputable (defined such by NewsGuard, a toolkit ranking
news website based on criteria of transparency and credibility, led by veteran
journalists and news entrepreneurs) news sources are posted and shared.
Kind and occurrences of the urls vary with respect to the corresponding
political community. Furthermore, some of the communities are characterised
by a small number of verified users that corresponds to a very large number
of acolytes which are (on their turn) very active, three times as much as the
acolytes of the opposite communities in the partition. In particular, when
considering the amount of retweets from poorly reputable news sites, one of
the communities is by far (one order of magnitude) much more active than
the others. As noted already in our previous publication [8], this extra
activity could be explained by a more skilled use of the systems of
propaganda – in that case a massive use of bot accounts and a targeted
activity against migrants (as resulted from the analysis of the hub list).
Our work could help in steering the online political discussion around Covid-19
towards an investigation on reputable information, while providing a clear
indication of the political inclination of those participating in the debates. More
generally, we hope that our work will contribute to finding appropriate strategies
to fight online misinformation. While not completely unexpected, it is striking to
Page 19 of 22
see how political polarisation affects also the Covid-19 debate, giving rise to
on-line communities of users that, for number and structure, almost closely
correspond to their political affiliations.
5 Methods
This section recaps the methodology through which we have obtained the
communities of verified users (see Section 3.1). This methodology has been
designed in Saracco et al. [25] and applied in the field of social networks for the
first time in [4, 8].
For the sake of completeness, the Supplementary Material, Section 3, recaps the
methodology through which we have obtained the validated retweet activity
network shown in Section 3.3. In Section 4 of the Supplementary Material, the
detection of the affiliation of unverified users is described.
In the Supplementary Material, the interested reader will also find additional
details about 1) the definition of the null models (Section 5); 2) a comparison
among various label propagation for the political affiliation of unverified users
(Section 6); and 3) a brief state of the art on fact checking organizations and
literature on false news detection (Section 7).
5.1 Inferring the political affiliation of verified Twitter users
Many results in the analysis of online social networks (OSN) shows that users are
highly clustered in group of opinions [1, 11–15, 22, 28, 29]; indeed those groups
have some peculiar behaviours, as the echo chamber effects [14, 15]. Following the
example of references [4, 8], we are making use of this users’ clustering in order to
detect discursive community, i.e. groups of users interacting among themselves by
retweeting on the same (covid-related) subjects. Remarkably, our procedure does
not follow the analysis of the text shared by the various users, but is simply
related on the retweeting activity among users. In the present subsection we will
examine how the discursive community of verified Twitter users can be extracted.
On Twitter there are two distinct categories of accounts: verified and unverified
users. Verified users have a thick close to the screen name: the platform itself,
upon request from the user, has a procedure to check the authenticity of the
account. Verified accounts are owned by politicians, journalists or VIPs in general,
as well as the official accounts of ministers, newspapers, newscasts, companies and
so on; for those kind of users, the verification procedure guarantees the identity of
their account and reduce the risk of malicious accounts tweeting in their name.
Non verified accounts are for standard users: in this second case, we cannot trust
any information provided by the users. The information carried by verified users
has been studied extensively in order to have a sort of anchor for the related
discussion [4, 6, 8, 20, 27]
To detect the political orientation we consider the bipartite network represented
by verified (on one layer) and unverified (on the other layer) accounts: a link is
connecting the verified user v with the unverified one u if at least one time v was
retweeted by u, or viceversa. To extract the similarity of users, we compare the
commonalities with a bipartite entropy-based null-model, the Bipartite
Configuration Model (BiCM [24]). The rationale is that two verified users that
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Figure 8 Schematic representation of the projection procedure for bipartite undirected networks.
a) an example of a real bipartite network. For the actual application, the two layers represent
verified (turquoise) and unverified (gray) users and a link between nodes of different layers is
present if one of the two users retweeted the other one, at least once. b) Definition of the Bipartite
Configuration Model (BiCM) ensemble. Such ensemble includes all possible link realisations, once
the number of nodes per layers has been fixed. c) we focus our attention on nodes i and j, i.e.,
two verified users, and count the number of common neighbours (in magenta both the nodes and
the links to their common neighbours). Subsequently, d) we compare this measure on the real
network with the one on the ensemble: If this overlap is statistically significant with respect to the
BiCM, e) we have a link connecting the two verified users in the projected network.
share many links to same unverified accounts probably have similar visions, as
perceived by the audience of unverified accounts. We then apply the method
of [25], graphically depicted in Fig. 8, in order to get a statistically validated
projection of the bipartite network of verified and unverified users. In a nutshell,
the idea is to compare the amount of common linkage measured on the real
network with the expectations of an entropy-based null model fixing (on average)
the degree sequence: if the associated p-value is so low that the overlaps cannot be
explained by the model, i.e. such that it is not compatible with the degree
sequence expectations, they carry non trivial information and we project the
related information on the (monopartite) projection of verified users.
The interested reader can find the technical details about this validated projection
in [25] and in the Supplementary Information.
6 Availability of Data and Materials
The data that support the findings of this study are available from Twitter, but
restrictions apply to the availability of these data, which were used under license
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for the current study, and so are not publicly available. Data are however available
from the authors upon reasonable request and with permission of Twitter.
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1 Italian socio-political situation during the period of data
collection
In the present subsection we present some crucial facts for the understanding of
the social context in which our analysis is set. This subsection is divided into two
parts: the contagion evolution and the political situation. These two aspects are
closely related.
1.1 Evolution of the Covid-19 epidemics in Italy
A first Covid-19 outbreak was detected in Codogno, Lodi, Lombardy region, on
February, 19th[1]. In the very next day, two cases were detected in Vo`, Padua,
Veneto region. On February, 22th, in order to contain the contagions, the national
government decided to put in quarantine 11 municipalities, 10 in the area around
Lodi and Vo`, near Padua[2]. Nevertheless, the number of contagions raised to 79,
hitting 5 different regions; one of the infected person in Vo` died, representing the
first registered Italian Covid-19 victim[3]. On February, 23th there were already
229 confirmed cases in Italy. The first lockdown should have lasted until the 6th of
March, but due to the still increasing number of contagions in northern Italy, the
Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte intended to extend the quarantine zone to
almost all the northern Italy on Sunday, March 8th[4]: travel to and from the
quarantine zone were limited to case of extreme urgency. A draft of the decree
announcing the expansion of the quarantine area appeared on the website of the
Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera on the late evening of Saturday, 7th,
causing some panic in the interested areas[5]: around 1000 people, living in Milan,
but coming from southern regions, took trains and planes to reach their place of
[1]Prima Lodi, ““Paziente 1”, il merito della diagnosi va diviso... per due”, 8th June
2020
[2]Italian Gazzetta Ufficiale, “DECRETO-LEGGE 23 Febbraio 2020, n. 6”. The date
is intended to be the very first day of validity of the decree.
[3]Il Fatto Quotidiano, “Coronavirus, e` morto il 78enne ricoverato nel Padovano. 15
contagiati in Lombardia, un altro in Veneto”, 22nd February 2020.
[4]BBC News, “Coronavirus: Northern Italy quarantines 16 million people”, 8th
March 2020”
[5]The Guardian, “Leaked coronavirus plan to quarantine 16m sparks chaos in Italy”,
8th March 2020
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origins[6][7]. In any case, the new quarantine zone covered the entire Lombardy
and partially other 4 regions.
Remarkably, close to Bergamo, Lombardy region, a new outbreak was discovered
and the possibility of defining a new quarantine area on March 3th was
considered: this opportunity was later abandoned, due to the new northern Italy
quarantine zone of the following days. This delay seems to have caused a strong
increase in the number of contagions, making the Bergamo area the most affected
one, in percentage, of the entire country[8]; at time of writing, there are
investigations regarding the responsibility of this choice.
On March, 9th, the lockdown was extended to the whole country, resulting in the
first country in the world to decide for national quarantine[9]. Travels were
restricted to emergency reason or to work; all business activities that were not
considered as essentials, as pharmacies and supermarkets, had to be closed. Until
the 21st of March lockdown measures became progressively stricter all over the
country. Starting from the 14th of April, some retails activities as children
clothing shops, reopened. A first fall in the number of deaths was observed on the
20th of April[10]. A limited reopening started with the so-called “Fase 2” (Phase
2 ) on the 4th of May[11].
From the very first days of March, the limited capacity of the intensive care
departments to take care of covid-infected patients, took to the necessity of a
re-organization of Italian hospitals, leading, e.g., to the opening of new intensive
care departments[12]. Moreover, new communication forms with the relatives of
the patients were proposed, new criteria for the intubating patients were
developed, and, in the extreme crisis, in the most infected cases, the emergency
management took to give priority to the hospitalisation to patients with a higher
probability to recover[13].
Outbreaks were mainly present in hospitals [19]. Unfortunately, healthcare workers
were contaminated by the Covid[14]. This contagion resulted in a relative high
number of fatalities: by the 22nd of April, 145 Covid deaths were registered among
[6]il Messaggero, “Coronavirus, a Milano la fuga dalla ”zona rossa”: folla alla stazione
di Porta Garibaldi”, 8th March 2020”
[7]repubblica.it, “Coronavirus, l’illusione della grande fuga da Milano. Ecco i veri
numeri degli spostamenti verso sud”, 23rd April 2020
[8]sky.com, “Coronavirus: Italian army called in as crematorium struggles to cope
with deaths”, 19th March 2020.
[9]BBC News, “Coronavirus: Italy extends emergency measures nationwide”, 10th
March 2020
[10]Al Jazeera, “Italy sees first fall of active coronavirus cases: Live updates”, 20th
April, 2020.
[11]Repubblica.it, “Coronavirus in Italia, verso primo ok spostamenti dal 4/5, non
tra Regioni. Conte: ”Non e` un liberi tutti””, 22nd April 2020
[12]The New York Times, “Italy’s Health Care System Groans Under Coronavirus
— a Warning to the World”, 12th March 2020.
[13]Il Corriere della Sera, “Coronavirus, il medico di Bergamo: ”Negli ospedali siamo
come in guerra. A tutti dico: state a casa””, 9th March 2020.
[14]Ansa.it, “Coronavirus: Ordini degli infermieri, 4 mila i contagiati”, 29th March
2020.
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doctors. Due to the pressure on the intensive care capacity, even the healthcare
personnel was subject to extreme stress, especially in the most affected zones[15].
1.2 Italian political situation during the Covid-19 pandemics
On August 8th, 2019, the leader of Lega, the main Italian right wing party,
announced to negate the support to the government of Giuseppe Conte, which was
formed after a post-election coalition between the Movement 5 Stars -M5S- and
the Lega. Giuseppe Conte resigned on the 20th of August and open to the
political crisis. After few days of negotiation, M5S, the most represented party in
the Italian parliament, agreed to form a new government with the Italian
Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD). PD, on the other hand, agreed,
upon the suggestion of the former secretary and prime minister Matteo Renzi.
After the formation of the new government, again led by Giuseppe Conte, Matteo
Renzi formed a new center-left party, Italia Viva (Italy alive, IV), due to some
discord with PD; despite the scission, Italia Viva continued to support the actual
government, having some of its representatives among the ministers and
undersecretaries, but often marking its distance respect to both Pd and M5S.
Due to the great impact that Matteo Salvini and Giorgia Meloni -leader of Fratelli
d’Italia, a right wing party- have on social media, they started a massive
campaign against the government the day after its inauguration.
The regions of Lombardy, Veneto, Piedmont and Emilia-Romagna experienced the
highest number of contagions during the pandemics; among those, the former 3
are administrated by the right and center-right wing parties, the fourth one by the
PD. The disagreement in the management of the pandemics between regions and
the central government was the occasion to exacerbate the political debate (in
Italy, regions have a quite wide autonomy for healthcare). The regions
administrated by the right wing parties criticised the centrality of the decisions
regarding the lock down, while the national government criticises the health
management (in Lombardy the healthcare system has a peculiar organisation, in
which the private sector is supported by public funding) and its non effective
measure to reduce the number of contagions. The debate was ridden even at a
national level: the opposition criticized the financial origin of the support to the
various economic sectors. Moreover, the role of the European Union in providing
funding to recover Italian economics after the pandemics was debated.
2 Composition of the subcommunities in the validated network
of verified Twitter users
Here, we detail the composition of the communities shown in Figure 1 of the main
text. We remind the reader that, after applying the Leuven algorithm to the
validated network of verified Twitter users, we could observe 4 main communities,
that correspond to
1 Right wing parties and media (in steel blue)
2 Center left wing (dark red)
3 5 Stars Movement (M5S ), in dark orange
[15]Internazionale, “Il dolore invisibile dei medici in corsia contro il coronavirus”, 1st
April 2020.
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4 Institutional accounts (in sky blue)
Starting from the center-left wing, we can find a darker red community, including
various NGOs (the Italian chapters of UNICEF, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Action
Aid, Emergency, Save the Children, etc.), various left oriented journalists, VIPs
and pundits[16]. Finally, we can find in this group political movements
(‘6000sardine’) and politicians on the left of PD (as Beppe Civati, Pietro Grasso,
Ignazio Marino) or on the left current of the PD (Laura Boldrini, Michele
Emiliano, Stefano Bonaccini). A slightly lighter red sub-community turns out to
be composed by the main politicians of the Italian Democratic Party (PD), as well
as by representatives from the European Parliament (Italian and others) and some
EU commissioners. The violet red group is mostly composed by the
representatives of the newly founded Italia Viva, by the former Italian prime
minister Matteo Renzi (December 2014 - February 2016) and former secretary of
PD. In golden red we can find the subcommunity of Catholic and Vatican groups.
Finally the dark violet red and light tomato subcommunities are composed mainly
by journalists. Interestingly enough, the dark violet red contains also accounts
related to the city of Milan (the major, the municipality, the public services
account) and to the spoke person of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affair.
In turn, also the orange (M5S) community shows a clear partition in
substructures. In particular, the dark orange subcommunity contains the accounts
of politicians, parliament representatives and ministers of the M5S and journalists
and the official account of Il Fatto Quotidiano, a newspaper supporting the
Movement 5 Stars. Interestingly, since one of the main leaders of the Movement,
Luigi Di Maio, is also the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, we can find in this
subcommunity also the accounts of several Italian embassies around the world, as
well as the account of the Italian representatives at NATO, OCSE and OAS. In
aquamarine, we can find the official accounts of some private and public, national
and international, health institutes (as the Italian Istituto Superiore di Sanita`,
literally the Italian National Institute of Health, the World Health Organization,
the Fondazione Veronesi) the Minister of Health Roberto Speranza, and some
foreign embassies in Italy. Finally, in the Light Slate Blue subcommunity we can
find various Italian ministers as well as the Italian police and army forces.
Similar considerations apply to the steel blue community. In steel blue, the
subcommunity of center right and right wing parties (as Forza Italia, Lega and
Fratelli d’Italia). The presidents of the regions of Lombardy, Veneto and Liguria,
administrated by center right and right wing parties, can be found here. (In the
following this subcommunity is going to be called as FI-L-FdI, recalling the
initials of the political parties contributing to this group.) The sky blue
subcommunity includes the national federations of various sports, the official
accounts of athletes and sport players (mostly soccer) and their teams, as well as
sport journals, newscasts and journalists. The teal subcommunity contains the
main Italian news agencies, some of the main national and local newspapers,
[16]As the cartoonists Makkox and Vauro, the singers Marracash, FrankieHiNRG,
Ligabue and emphil Volo vocal band, and journalists from Repubblica (Ezio Mauro,
Carlo Verdelli, Massimo Giannini), from La7 TV channel (Ricardo Formigli, Diego
Bianchi).
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newscasts and their journalists. In this subcommunity there are also the accounts
of many universities; interestingly enough, it includes also the all the local public
service local newscasts. The firebrick subcommunity contains accounts related to
the AS Roma football club; analogously in dark red official accounts of AC Milan
and its players. The slate blue subcommunity is mainly composed by the official
accounts of radio and TV programs of Mediaset, the main private Italian
broadcasting company, together with singers and musicians. Other smaller
subcommunities includes other sport federations, and sports pundits.
Finally, the sky blue community is mainly composed by Italian embassies around
the world. The navy subpartition contains also the official accounts of the
President of the Republic, the Italian Minister of Defense and the one of the
Commissioner for Economy at EU and former prime minister, Paolo Gentiloni.
3 Backbone of the retweet network
In the study of every phenomenon, it is of utmost importance to distinguish the
relevant information from the noise. Here, we remind a framework to obtain a
validated monopartite retweet network of users: the validation accounts the
information carried by not only the activity of the users, but also by the virality of
their messages. We represented pictorially the method in Fig. 1.
We define a directed bipartite network in which one layer is composed by accounts
and the other one by the tweets. An arrow connecting a user u to a tweet t
represents the u writing the message t. The arrow in the opposite direction means
that the user u is retweeting the message t. To filter out the random noise from
this network, we make use of the directed version of the BiCM, i.e. the Bipartite
Directed Configuration Model (BiDCM [15]). The projection procedure is then,
analogous to the one presented in the previous subsection: it is pictorially
displayed in the Fig. 1.
Briefly, consider the couple of users u0 and u1 and consider the number of message
written by u0 and shared u1. Then, calculate which is the distribution of the same
measure according with the BiDCM: if the related p-value is statistically
significant, i.e. if the number of u0’s tweets shared by u1 is much more than
expected by the BiDCM, we project a (directed) link from u0 to u1. Summarising,
the comparison of the observation on the real network with the BiDCM permits to
uncover all contributions that cannot originate from the constraints of the
null-model.
4 Political affiliation of non verified Twitter users
Using the technique described in Subsection 5.1 of the main text, we are able to
assign to almost all verified users a community, based on the perception of the
unverified users. Due to the fact that the identity of verified users are checked by
Twitter, we have the possibility of controlling our groups. Indeed, as we will show
in the following, the network obtained via the bipartite projection provides a
reliable description regarding the closeness of opinions and role in the social
debate. How can we use this information in order to infer the orientation of non
verified users? In the reference [6] we used the tags obtained for both verified and
unverified users in the bipartite network described in Subsection 5.1 of the main
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Figure 1 Schematic representation of the projection procedure for bipartite directed network. a)
an example of a real directed bipartite network. For the actual application, the two layers represent
Twitter accounts (turquoise) and posts (gray). A link from a turquoise node to a gray one
represents that the post has been written by the user; a link in the opposite direction represents a
retweet by the considered account. b) the Bipartite Directed Configuration Model (BiDCM)
ensemble is defined. The ensemble includes all the link realisations, once the number of nodes per
layer has been fixed. c) we focus our attention on nodes i and j and count the number of directed
common neighbours (in magenta both the nodes and the links to their common neighbours), i.e.,
the number of posts written by i and retweeted by j. Subsequently, d) we compare this measure
on the real network with the one on the ensemble: if this overlap is statistically significant with
respect to the BiDCM, e) we have a link from i to j in the projected network.
text and propagated those labels accross the network. In a recent analysis, we
observed that other approaches are more stable [16]: in the present manuscript we
make use of the most stable algorithm. We use the label propagation as proposed
in [22] on the directed validated network. Indeed, the validated directed network
described in Section 3 capture the effective flux of information from user to user,
thus it permits to focus on the relevant information regarding the exchange of
content. In the present case, the only labels we are considering are those of the
verified users in the validated undirected projection described in 5.1 –main text–,
(aka, the soundest ones): all others are obtained via the label propagation. Due to
some flickering (actually, in the label propagation of [22] there are some
randomness due to the possibility of degeneracy in the majority of the label of
neighbours), we repeated 1000 the label propagation algorithm: the final label are
the most frequent ones.
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5 Entropy-based null-models
In the present appendix we remind the main steps for the definition of an entropy
based null model; the interested reader can refer to the review [8]. We start by
revising the Bipartite Configuration Model [23], that has been used for detecting
the network of similarities of verified users. We are then going to examine the
extension of this model to bipartite directed networks [15]. Finally, we present the
general methodology to project the information contained in a -directed or
undirected- bipartite network, as developed in [24].
5.1 Bipartite Configuration Model
Let us consider a bipartite network G∗Bi, in which the two layers are L and Γ.
Define GBi the ensemble of all possible graphs with the same number of nodes per
layer as in G∗Bi. It is possible to define the entropy related to the ensemble as [20]:
S = −
∑
GBi∈GBi
P (GBi) lnP (GBi), (1)
where P (GBi) is the probability associated to the instance GBi. Now we want to
obtain the maximum entropy configuration, constraining some relevant topological
information regarding the system. For the bipartite representation of verified and
unverified user, a crucial ingredient is the degree sequence, since it is a proxy of
the number of interactions (i.e. tweets and retweets) with the other class of
accounts. Thus in the present manuscript we focus on the degree sequence. Let us
then maximise the entropy (1), constraining the average over the ensemble of the
degree sequence. It can be shown, [24], that the probability distribution over the
ensemble is
P (GBi) =
∏
i,α
(piα)
miα (1− piα)1−miα , (2)
where miα represent the entries of the biadjacency matrix describing the bipartite
network under consideration and piα is the probability of observing a link between
the nodes i ∈ L and α ∈ Γ. The probability piα can be expressed in terms of the
Lagrangian multipliers x and y for nodes on L and Γ layers, respectively, as
piα =
xi yα
1 + xi yα
. (3)
In order to obtain the values of x and y that maximize the likelihood to observe
the real network, we need to impose the following conditions [13, 26]

〈ki〉 =
∑
α∈Γ
piα = k
∗
i ∀i ∈ L
〈kα〉 =
∑
i∈L
piα = k
∗
α ∀α ∈ Γ.
, (4)
where the ∗ indicates quantities measured on the real network.
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Actually, the real network is sparse: the bipartite network of verified and
unverified users has a connectance ρ ' 3.58× 10−3. In this case the formula (3)
can be safely approximated with the Chung-Lu configuration model, i.e.
piα ' xiyα = k
∗
i k
∗
α
m
,
where m is the total number of links in the bipartite network.
5.2 Bipartite Directed Configuration Model
In the present subsection we will consider the case of the extension of the BiCM to
direct bipartite networks and highlight the peculiarities of the network under
analysis in this representation. The adjancency matrix describing a direct
bipartite network of layers L and Γ has a peculiar block structure, once nodes are
order by layer membership (here the nodes on L layer first):
A =
(
O M
NT O
)
, (5)
where the O blocks represent null matrices (indeed they describe links connecting
nodes inside the same layer: by construction they are exactly zero) and M and N
are non zero blocks, describing links connecting nodes on layer L with those on
layer Γ and viceversa. In general M 6= N, otherwise the network is not
distinguishable from an undirected one.
We can perform the same machinery of the section above, but for the extension of
the degree sequence to a directed degree sequence, i.e. considering the in- and
out-degrees for nodes on the layer L,
kouti =
∑
α∈Γ
miα and k
in
i =
∑
α∈Γ
niα (6)
(here miα and niα represent respectively the entry of matrices M and N) and for
nodes on the layer Γ,
koutα =
∑
i∈L
niα and k
in
α =
∑
i∈L
miα. (7)
The definition of the Bipartite Directed Configuration Model (BiDCM, [15]), i.e.
the extension of the BiCM above, follows closely the same steps described in the
previous subsection. Interestingly enough, the probabilities relative to the presence
of links from L to Γ are independent on the probabilities relative to the presence of
links from Γ to L. If qiα is the probability of observing a link from node i to node
α and q′iα the probability of observing a link in the opposite direction, we have
qiα =
xouti y
in
α
1 + xouti y
in
α
and q′iα =
xini y
out
α
1 + xini y
out
α
, (8)
where xouti and x
in
i are the Lagrangian multipliers relative to the node i ∈ L,
respectively for the out- and the in-degrees, and youtα and y
in
α are the analogous for
α ∈ Γ.
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In the present application we have some simplifications: the bipartite directed
network representation describes users (on one layer) writing and retweeting posts
(on the other layer). If users are on the layer L and posts on the opposite layer
and miα represents the user i writing the post α, then k
in
α = 1∀α ∈ Γ, since each
message cannot have more than an author. Notice that, since our constraints are
conserved on average, we are considering, in the ensemble of all possible
realisations even instances in which kinα > 1 or k
in
α = 0, or, otherwise stated, non
physical; nevertheless the average is constrained to the right value, i.e. 1. The fact
that kinα is the same for every α allows for a great simplification of the probability
per link on M:
qiα =
(kouti )
∗
NΓ
, (9)
where NΓ is the total number of nodes on the Γ layer. The simplification in (9) is
extremely helpful in the projected validation of the bipartite directed network [2].
5.3 Validation of the projected network
The information contained in a bipartite -directed or undirected- network, can be
projected onto one of the two layers. The rationale is to obtain a monopartite
network encoding the non trivial interactions among the two layers of the original
bipartite network. The method is pretty general, once we have a null model in
which probabilities per link are independent, as it is the case of both BiCM and
BiDCM [24].
The first step is represented by the definition of a bipartite motif that may
capture the non trivial similarity (in the case of an undirected bipartite network)
or flux of information (in the case of a directed bipartite network). This quantity
can be captured by the number of V−motifs between users i and j [11, 23],
Vij =
∑
α∈Γ
miαmjα, (10)
or by its direct extension
Vij =
∑
α∈Γ
miαnαj (11)
(note that Vij 6= Vji). We compare the abundance of these motifs with the null
models defined above: all motifs that cannot be explained by the null model, i.e.
whose p-value are statistically significance, are validated into the projection on
one of the layers [24].
In order to assess the statistically significance of the observed motifs, we calculate
the distribution associated to the various motifs. For instance, the expected value
for the number of V-motifs connecting i and j in an undirected bipartite network
is
〈Vij〉 =
∑
α∈Γ
piα pjα, (12)
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where piαs are the probability of the BiCM. Analogously,
〈Vij〉 =
∑
p∈P
qiα q
′
jα =
(kouti )
∗(kinj )
∗
NΓ
, (13)
where in the last step we use the simplification of (9) [2].
In both the direct and the undirect case, the distribution of the V-motifs or of the
directed extensions is Poisson Binomial one, i.e. a binomial distribution in which
each event shows a different probability. In the present case, due to the sparsity of
the analysed networks, we can safely approximate the Poisson-Binomial
distribution with a Poisson one [14].
In order to state the statistical significance of the observed value, we calculate the
related p-values according to the relative null-models. Once we have a p-value for
every detected V-motif, the related statistical significance can be established
through the False Discovery Rate (FDR) procedure [3]. Respect to other multiple
test hypothesis, FDR controls the number of False Positives. In our case, all
rejected hypotheses identify the amount of V-motifs that cannot be explained only
by the ingredients of the null model and thus carry non trivial information
regarding the systems. In this sense, the validated projected network includes a
link for every rejected hypothesis, connecting the nodes involved in the related
motifs.
6 Label propagation comparison
In the main text, we solved the problem of assigning the orientation to all relevant
users in the validated retweet network via a label propagation. The approach is
similar, but different to the one proposed in [6], the differences being in the
starting labels, in the label propagation algorithm and in the network used. In this
section we will revise the method employed in the present article, as compared it
to the one in [6] and evaluate the deviations from other approaches.
First step of our methodology is to extract the polarisation of verified users from
the bipartite network, as described in Section 5.1 of the main text, in order to use
it as seed labels in the label propagation.
In reference [6], a measure of the “adherence” of the unverified users towards the
various communities of verified users was used in order to infer their orientation,
following the approach in [2], in turn based on the polarisation index defined
in [4]. This approach was extremely performing when practically all unverified
users interact at least once with verified one, as in [2]. While still having good
performances in a different dataset as the one studied in [6], we observed isolated
deviations: it was the case of users with frequent interactions with other unverified
accounts of the same (political) orientation, randomly retweeting a different
discursive community verified user. In this case, focusing just on the interaction
with verified accounts, those nodes were assigned a wrong orientation. The labels
for the polarisation of the unverified users defined [6] were subsequently used as
seed labels in the label propagation. Due to the possibility described above of
assigning wrongly labels to unverified accounts, in the present paper, we consider
only the tags of verified users, since they pass a strict validation procedure and are
more stable.
Page 11 of 15
There is another difference in the label propagation used here against the one
in [6]: in the present paper we used the label propagation of [22], while the one
in [6] was quite home-made. As in reference [22], the seed labels of [6] are fixed,
i.e. are not allowed to change [17]. The main difference is that, in case of a draw,
among the labels of the first neighbours, in [22] a tie is removed randomly, while
in the algorithm of [6] the label is not assigned and goes into a new run, with the
newly assigned labels. Moreover, the updated of labels in [22] is asynchronous,
while it is synchronous in [6]. We opted for the one in [22] for being actually a
standard in the label propagation algorithms, being stable, more studied, and
faster[18].
Finally, differently from the procedure in [6], we applied the label propagation not
to the entire (undirected version of the) retweet network, but on the (undirected
version of the) validated one. (The intent of choosing the undirected version is
that in both case in which a generic account is significantly retweeting or being
retweeted by another one, they do probably share some vision of the phenomena
under analysis, thus we are not interested in the direction of the links, in this
situation.) The rationale in using the validated network is to reduce the
calculation time (due to the dimensions of the dataset), while obtaining an
accurate result. While the previous differences from the procedure of [6] are
dictated by conservativeness (the choice of the seed labels) or by the adherence to
a standard (the choice of [22]), this last one may be debatable: why choosing the
validated network should return “better” results than the ones calculated on the
entire retweet network? We consider the case of a single day (in order to reduce
the calculation time) and studied 6 different approaches:
1 a Louvain community detection [5] on the undirected version of the
validated network of retweets;
2 a Louvain community detection on the undirected version of the unweighted
retweet network;
3 a Louvain community detection on the undirected version of the weighted
retweet network, in which the weights are the number of retweets from user
to user;
4 a label propagation a la Raghavan et al. [22] on the directed validated
network of retweets;
5 a label propagation a la Raghavan et al. on the (unweighted) retweet
network;
6 a label propagation a la Raghavan et al. on the weighted retweet network,
the weights being the number of retweets from user to user.
Actually, due to the order dependence of Louvain [12], we run several times the
Louvain algorithm after reshuffling the order of the nodes, taking the partition in
communities that maximise the modularity. Similarly, the label propagation of
[22] has a certain level of randomness: we run it several times and choose the most
frequent label assignment for every node.
[17]Actually, in [22] seed labels may be allowed to vary. Due to our application, we
consider here the version in which they remain fixed.
[18]In the present paper we used the implementation of the label propagation in [22]
that can be found in the python-igraph python module.
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In order to compare the results obtained with the various approaches, we
calculated the Variation of Information (VI, [17]). V I considers exactly the
different in information contents captured by two different partition, as consider
by the Shannon entropy. Results are reported in the matrix in Figure 2 for the
23th of February (results are similar for other days). Even when using the
weighted retweet network as “exact” result, the partition found by the label
propagation of our approach has a little loss of information, comparable with the
one of using an unweighted approach. Indeed, the results found by the various
community detection algorithms show little agreement with the label propagation
ones. Nevertheless, we still prefer the label propagation procedure, since the
validated projection on the layer of verified users is theoretically sound and has a
non trivial interpretation.
Figure 2 The Variation of Information table for the 23rd February 2020. (The date was chosen
randomly.) The community detection algorithms do not agree so much even among themselves.
Instead, the label propagation approaches results are quite similar. Due to this behaviour, we
focus on the lightest one, i.e. the one calculated on the validated retweet network.
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7 Fact-checking and low reputable news detection
The main result of this work quantifies the level of diffusion on Twitter of news
published by sources considered scarcely reputable. Academy, Governments, and
News Agencies are working hard to classify information sources according to
criteria of credibility and transparency of published news. This is the case, for
example, of NewsGuard, which we used for the tagging of the most frequent
domains in the direct validated network obtained according to the methodology
presented in the previous sections. As introduced in Subsection 3.2 of the main
text, the NewsGuard browser extension and mobile app[19] offers a reliability result
for the most popular newspapers in the world, summarizing with a numerical
score the level of credibility and journalistic transparency of the newspaper.
With the same philosophy, but oriented towards US politics, the fact-checking site
PolitiFact.com reports with a ‘truth meter’ the degree of truthfulness of original
claims made by politicians, candidates, their staffs, and, more, in general,
protagonists of US politics. One of the eldest fact-checking websites dates back to
1994: snopes.com, in addition to political figures, is a fact-checker for hoaxes and
urban legends.
Generally speaking, a fact-checking site has behind it a multitude of editors and
journalists who, with a great deal of energy, manually check the reliability of a
news, or of the publisher of that news, by evaluating criteria such as, e.g., the
tendency to correct errors, the nature of the newspaper’s finances, and if there is a
clear differentiation between opinions and facts. Thus, it is worth noting that
recent attempts tried to automatically find articles worthy of being fact-checked.
For example, work in [1] uses a supervised classifier, based on an ensemble of
neural networks and Support Vector Machines, to figure out which politicians’
claims need to be debunked, and which have already been debunked.
Despite the tremendous effort of stakeholders to keep the fact-checking sites up to
date and functioning, disinformation resists debunking due to a combination of
factors. There are psychological aspects, like the quest for belonging to a
community and getting reassuring answers, the adherence to one’s viewpoint, a
native reluctance to change opinion [28, 29], the formation of echo chambers [10],
where people polarize their opinions as they are insulated from contrary
perspectives: these are key factors for people to contribute to the success of
disinformation spreading [7, 9]. Moreover, researchers demonstrate how the
spreading of false news is strategically supported by the massive and organized
use of trolls and bots [25].
Despite the need to educate the user to a conscious fruition of online information
through means also different from those represented by technological solutions,
there are a series of promising works that exploit classifiers based on machine
learning or on deep learning to tag a news as credible or not.
One interesting approach is based on the analysis of spreading patterns on social
platforms. Monti et al. recently provide a deep learning framework for detection of
fake news cascades [18]. A ground truth is acquired by following the example by
Vosoughi et al. [27] collecting Twitter cascades of verified false and true rumors.
Employing a novel deep learning paradigm for graph-based structures, cascades
[19]https://www.newsguardtech.com/
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are classified based on user profile, user activity, network and spreading, and
content. The main result of the work is that ‘a few hours of propagation are
sufficient to distinguish false news from true news with high accuracy’. This result
has been confirmed by other studies too. Work in [30], by Zhao et al. examine
diffusion cascades on Weibo and Twitter: focusing on topological properties, such
as the number of hops from the source and the heterogeneity of the network, the
authors demonstrate that networks in which fake news are diffused feature
characteristics really different from those diffusing genuine information. Diffusion
networks investigation appear to be a definitive path to follow for fake news
detection. This is also confirmed by Pierri et al. [21]: also here, the goal is to
classifying news articles pertaining to bad and genuine information‘ by solely
inspecting their diffusion mechanisms on Twitter’. Even in this case, results are
impressive: a simple Logistic Regression model is able to correctly classify news
articles with a high accuracy (AUROC up to 94%).
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